Document No. 1457 B

Page 1

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM FROM NOMURA TO TOYADA, dated September 12, 1941

Top Secret by Embassy Code

From Ambassador NOMURA Afternoon, September 11, Shows 16 (1941) Washington (by secret)

To Foreign Minister TOYADA Arrived at the Ministry, Afternoon September 12, Showa 16 (1941)

Telegram No. 810.

The difficult points of the present Japanese-American negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations are, as you are well aware of by my repeated telegrams, the problems regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and stationing of troops for anti-Comintern purposes, and I think the U.S.A. is in the position where she cannot recognize the stipulated terms between our side and the Nanking Government upon this matter, not only in the light of the public opinion in the country, but also from the viewpoint of her obligation as a mediator toward China. Consequently in the American proposal of 21 June there is included a clause to the effect that the evacuation should be effected as soon as possible in compliance with the stipulations to be newly agreed upon between Japan and China. And her attitude having been more stiffened of late, she has mentioned the complete evacuation of troops within two years after the restoration of peace (one of the causes of the above stiffening is believed to be the result of her talks with the Chinese side), and it is felt that toward the new proposal advanced from our government, the U.S.A. apparently shows no serious disapproval in points other than that of the evacuation, against which she seems to have strong opposition.

And, after all, according to my observation, there is a great possibility for the negotiation to split on the rocks in the final stages due to this evacuation problem. To avoid it, therefore, I earnestly wish that following the general line of the American request and without making reference to the stationing of troops, you deliberate how to deal with the proposal for the evacuation of troops within two years after peace restoration.

When an official of the State Department visited me yesterday, I postponed the explanation of this matter to a later occasion. For the sake of negotiating and partly for the above reason, your final decision upon this matter is earnestly desired at the carliest moment. Document No. 1457 B

Page 2

Essentially the evacuation problem concerns exclusively Japan and China, and the U.S.A. refers to it only to exercise good offices. In any case, should negotiations develop after our government adopts this proposal, considerable time will surely be needed from the time of the meeting of the responsible heads of both countries, to the conclusion of detailed agreement, until the holding of the Sino-Japanese truce and peace conference. It may possibly require more than one year. And so, even if we should now promise the evacuation within two years, there may arise during the interval, on account of the development in the international situation and of the circumstances at the actual places concerned, some opportunities of renewing talks between Japan and China to prolong the period of stationing troops. Moreover, it may be possible that we can remain under the excuse of protecting the lives and proporties of the Japanese in China. Therefore, in my opinion, the concession to this proposal will not necessarily lead to the result contradictory to the policy adopted so far by our government. A although I believe that it must be a very difficult national problem, I earnestly request you to send me my instructions as soon as possible.

With reference to the above, the item of "stationing troops for anti-Comintern purposes," should be eliminated, but it is permissible to retain one section pertaining to Sino-Japanese ecoperation (non-military) to prevent actions detrimental to national peace.

Incidentally, it appears that the Japanese press has been making some optimistic broadcasts in the last few days that the Japanese-American agreement was near at hand. But, as we have difficult questions such as the evacuation of troops, etc., it is better not to have such premature optimistic opinions. Over here, Hull himself denied the above-said optimistic broadcasts at a press interview, and I request that you give some attention to the directing of the press. (End)